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RAYNA 'l'Ol\1
of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of
of
the trial court's determination
on
basis of new and additional
appear in the trial court record.
Id.-Want of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of Record.the
on habeas corpus has been limited
appearing on the face of the record
and no evidence dehors the record has been received to imthe judgment, though the scope of inquiry has been
extended to embrace additional evidence in instances where
contested the validity of a final judgment of conon the
that he had been denied the aid of
that
conviction had been secured solely by perused by prosecuting officials, or
he had been convicted was unconstitutional.
Id.-Want of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of Record.from the traditional scope of inquiry on habeas
as to permit consideration of new and additional
do not appear in the trial court record, is not warranted where petitioner's claims of lack of jurisdiction are
on federal statutes, the effect of which has been
"""u'"'u since petitioner committed his offenses, by legislation
the courts of this state unquestioned jurisdiction over
vutm"'"' committed in "All Indian country within the State."
u.s.c. § 1162.)
of Jurisdiction-Showing on Face of Record.had opportunity to raise a jurisdictional
presenting the alleged facts at his trial, but he
to do so and, on the facts there alleged and proved, the
trial court's implied determination that it had jurisdiction
was
he cannot relitigate that issue on habeas corpus.
[5] Criminal Law- Jurisdiction.- Federal jurisdiction over offenses committed within the state, which offenses are defined
state law, is exceptional and, in trials in the courts in this
u"""'""''V·"

See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus,§ 17; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus,
27.
McK. Dig. References: [1-4] Habeas Corpus,§ 10; [5] Criminal
Law,§ 76.

[ 48 C.2(l
defensive
matter.

PROCEEDING m habeas corpus to secure release from
Writ denied.

t~u:si

lVfason A. Bailey and Leonard ,J. Bloom for Petitimwr.

Edmuud CL Brown, Attorney General, Clarence A. Linn,
Assistant Attorney General, and Arlo E. Smith, Deputy At~
for Respondent.
SPENCE, ,J .·-l'etitioHer, Hayna 'l'om Carmen, is eonfined
in the state prison at San Quentin under judgments of eonviction of first degree murder and of assault with intent to
eommit murder. He seeks his release from custody upon
alleged jurisdictional grounds.
Petitioner was first convicted of the two offenses in the
Superior Court of l\Iadera County in 1950. Wilbur Dan
MeS1Yain was the victim of the murder and Alvin McSwain
was the vietim of the assault. The crimes were committed
neat· the home of the victims. The initial altercation between
the parties had occurred earlier the same morning at a point
in Madera County ~ome miles distant from the scene of the
erimes. After that altercation petitioner had driven to his
home, had obtained a gun, and had then driven to the home
of 1he vietims to await their return. The shooting occurred
immediately following their return, while Alvin MeSwain was
still in an automobile and ·wilbur Dan McSwain was standing
ncar it.
At the first trial it was alleged and proved that the crimes
had been committed in Madera County. Petitioner was convieted of both offenses and was sentenced to imprisonment for
the term prescribed by law on the assault count and to suffer
the death penalty on the murder count. Upon appeal, this
court affirmed the assault conviction and reversed the murder
eonviction. (People v. Carmen, 36 Cal.2d 768 [228 P.2d
.)
At the second trial in the Superior Court of Madera
petitioner was again convicted of first degree murder
for the killing of Wilbur· Dan MeSwain and was again
sentenced to suffer the death penalty. It was again alleged
and proved that the murder had been eommitted in Madera
County.
At the time of oral argument before this eourt on the appeal
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from the second murder conviction, it was suggested for the
first time that facts might be adduced showing that the
murder had been committed on a small tract of land within
Madera County known as an "Indian allotment," that such
allotment constituted "Indian country," and that petitioner
was an ''Indian,'' within the meaning of those terms as used in
certain federal statutes, with the result that exclusive jurisdiction over the offense might be vested in the federal courts.
(See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153, and 3242, as amended
May 24, 1949.) Petitioner thereupon filed an application to
produce on the appeal additional evidence relating to the
newly suggested facts. This court denied the application and
affirmed the second judgment of conviction. (People v.
Carmen, 43 Cal.2d 342 [273 P.2d 521].) Noting that the
facts shown in the trial court record were insufficient to show
exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts, this court stated
that "Since the defendant committed the crime in a county
of this state, it may not be assumed that any special circumstances existed ·which would deprive the state of jurisdiction.''
(P. 349.)
Thereafter petitioner commenced this habeas corpus proceeding, claiming a lack of jurisdiction in the courts of this
state on the basis of allegations that he and the :M:cSwains were
"Indians" and that the murder and the assault had been
committed in ''Indian country.'' Because o£ the alleged
jurisdictional questions involved, this court issued a writ of
habeas corpus and made an order of reference for the purpose
of determining the status of petitioner and Wilbur Dan McSwain, as well as the locus of the crimes. Hearings were
conducted and the referee filed his findings with this court.
The People contend that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the referee's findings concerning the status of petitioner
and Wilbur Dan McSwain. Upon further consideration, however, we have concluded that it is unnecessary to determine the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the referee's findings or
the adequacy of said findings. [1] We have reached this
conclusion because we are of the opinion that in the absence
of exceptional circumstances, which are not present here,
petitioner may not contest, in this collateral attack upon the
final judgments of conviction, the trial court's determination
and exercise of jurisdiction, upon the basis of new and additional facts which do not appear in the trial court record.
[2] We are here concerned with the nature of the inquiry
which may be made on habeas corpus where it is claimed that

trial <'<mrt of

P.2d
In rc
544] In rc Murphy, 79 Cal.App.
Ballas, 53 Cal.App. 109 [199 P.
496
P. 790]; see also 39
456.
However, it was said in In rc Connor,
712 fJ08 P.2d 10], that "
he scope
rorpus in this state may ... nnder
exttmd over the entire eonrse of
in
courts ... and may embrace additional evidence
this court either directly or under an order of referenc~e."
The scope of inquiry has been so extended in instances where
a petitioner has contested the validity of a final
of
conviction npon the ground that he had been denied the aiel
of counsel (In re Connor·, snpra, 16 Cal.2d 701) ; or that his
eon victior1 had been secured solely
perjured
knowingly used by prosecnting officials (In re
2d 1 [73 P.2d 554]) ; or that the law nuder vvhich he had been
convicted was unconstitutional
re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488 [122
P.2d 22]).
[3] The asserted grounds of chtimed lack of
ict ion in
the instant case, however, do not appear to be of stwh nature
as would warrant a departure from the traditional scope
inquiry or would permit the consideration of new and additional fads alleged by petitioner whieh do not appear in the
trial eourt reeord. 'l'he sit nat ion here
is
one in
whieh the asserted lack of jnrisrlietion is based npon H elaim
b.'- petitioner that he 1ms eonvietcd of
an uneomd:itutiona1 law or was denied an_'IT fnndamental constitutional
right. (See In 1"C Bell, supra, 19 Ca1.2d
501-502.
On
the eontrary, petitioner's claims are based
eral statutes (18 U.S.C.A.
l
effeet of which has been changed sinee
offenses, by legislation giving the eourts of this state unquestioned jurisdietion over offenses eommittcd in ''All I wlian
country within the state." (18
§
amended

Aug. 24,
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Petitioner had the ~~~~,,,,.,
raise the
the
here involved by
upon the facts there
He failed
court's
determination
the
over the offenses was correct. To
now
that issue would encourage
with crimes, the jurisdiction over which
upon
factual determinations, to withof those issues until after they had attempted
to obtain a favorable result at a trial on the
and
until such time as a conviction by the court claimed
to have
would be impossible by reason of the
statute of limitations, or otherwise. (See Ex parte Wallace,
81 Okla. Crim. 176 [162 P.2d 205].) The sanction of
such
would permit piecemeal litigation of factual
issues which should be finally determined upon a single trial.
[5] Federal jurisdiction over offenses which are committed
~within the boundaries of this state and which are defined by
state law exceptional and, in trials in the courts of this state,
such jurisdictional claims are ordinarily defensive matter.
v. Collins, 105 CaL 504, 509 [39 P. 16].) Petitioner therefore should have alleged and proved in the trial
court any facts which he now claims might have had the
effect of vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts.
The
conclusions are supported by both state and
federal authority. In Btate v. Utecht, 220 Minn. 431 [19
N.W.2d
161 A.L.R. 1316], and Ex parte W allacc, S1tpra,
81 Okla Crim. 176 [162 P.2d 205], the problem presented was
almost identical with that involved here. Petitioners therein
collateral attack on habeas corpus attempted for the first
time to contest the jurisdiction of the state courts of general
which had convicted them. It was claimed that
petitioners were ''Indians'' and that the crimes of which
had been convicted had been committed in ''Indian
country." Relief was denied in both cases upon the ground
that the determination of jurisdiction by a trial court of general jurisdiction was not subject to collateral attack on habeas
corpus where petitioners had not contested the jurisdiction of
the court at the trial nor brought to the trial court's attention
facts from which lack of jurisdiction could have been determined, and where upon the face of the trial court record there
was uo showing of lack of jurisdiction. (See also 39 C.J.S.,
Habeas Corpus, § 16, p. 456; 25 Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus,
~
P~ 16].) While in neither of the cited cases did peti-

RG6

C.2d

1iOJwr attempt to raise the jurisdictional question upon appeal
as was donP ill thP instant r:asP, the attempt
as heretofore
was mlfiW'I'rssfnL
l'ropln v. Car·men, supra, 4:l
( 'al.2d >l-1:2.) That. f:wt.or, tlwrPfnt'P, would not apprar to he
a tlisi
i,o;hing: 'llH'.
On nlnnerolls oceasions the federal l'OUrts have likewise
held tlwt a final jwlgmeut of ,·onvidion may not be attacked
on habeas corpus upon allegations of new and aclditional faets
,•]aimed to show ihat the convicting court lacked
oyer the offense because of the alleged status of the parties
or the
place where the crime was committed, at least
whell there was no affirmative showing of lack of jurisdiction
upon the face of the trial court record. (Toy 1'oy v. Hopkins,
212 TJ.S. G42 [29 S.Ct. 416, 53 L.Ed. 644]; Davis v. Johnston,
144 F.2d 8G2; Hatten
Hudspeth, 99 F.2d 501; Ex parte
Sal'lt[Je, ] 58 F. 205 sec also Rodman v. Potht"er, 264 U.S. 399
[44 S.Ct. :360, 68 L.Ed. 759]; In r-e Lincoln, 202 U.S. 178 [26
S.Ct. 602, 50 hEd. 984]; Walsh v. Johnston, 115 :F'.2d 806;
Walsh v. Archer, 7a F.2d 197; Archer v. Heath, :30 F.2d 932;
United 8/alcs v. Lail', 19;) F. 47 [115 C.C.A. 49] .)
Certain of the cited federal eases involved petitioners claiming that tlw fr~deral eonrts which had r~onvieted them lacked
jnrisdid im1 beeanse the petitioners therein were ''allotted
Indians" and no longer wards of the government (Toy Toy v.
Hopkins, supm E:r par·tc Savage, supra), or that the locus of
the erimc was no longer "Indian country" (1'oy 1'oy v.
Hopkins, supra: Davis v. Johnston, supra; Hatten v. Hudspeth,
In each instance the court refused to redetermine the question of jurisdiction. Moreover, the refusal was
not made dependent upon whether the jurisdictional issue had
lwPH raised at the trial or whether at the time of trial petitioner was aware of the facts upon which the alleged hek of
jurisdiction was later asserted. Thus in Davis v. Johnston,
supra, 144 F.2d 862, it was said: "In appellant's petition
he states that lw did not object to the jurisdiction of the
r•ourt in the trial of the criminal case for the reason, he
now alleges that he was not aware of the fact that the store
building in which the crime was committed was not within the
reservation. 'l'hc decision of the court in the criminal case
npon the factual t1ucstiou of jurisdiction is equally conclusive
whether or not it was raised by the defendant."
'rhe ease of 1'ooisgah v. United States, 186 ]'.2d 93, is not
helpful to petitioner. There an Indian sought redetermination
of the trial court's jurisdietion by a motion to vacate under
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section
United States Code Annotated. The
court, one judge dissenting, reexamined the question of jurisdiction, found as a matter of law that it was lacking, and
directed that the judgment be vacated. The court was careful,
however, to distinguish two of the above cited eases, stating
at pages 95-96: "Unlike Hatten v.
10
99
F.2d 501, and Davis v.
9
144 F.2d 862, no new
or additional facts 11 re
into the case,
and no afljndicatcd facif' are songht to be impeached." It
appears dear from the quoted language that the
case is
likewise distingni:-;bab1r, sinee we determim~d on the second
appeal (People v.
supra, 43 Cal.2d 342) that there
were no facts in the trial eourt reeord ·which showed lack of
jurisdiction in the trial court. Petitioner's claim is therefore
wholly dependent upon new and additional facts which he
seeks to inject i uto this proceeding as the basis for his collateral attack. 1Tnder the rule established by the numerous
state and federal decisions, such collateral attack is not permitted under the circumstances; and if there may be said to
be anything in the opinions in State ex rel. Irvine v. District
Court, 125 Mont. 308 f239 P.2d 2721, or Application of Andy,
49 Wn.2c1 449 [302 P.2d 963/, which lends support to petitioner's position, it is io that extent out of harmony with the
rstablisbed rule and should not be followeil.
The established rule was clarified but not modified in Bowen
v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 27 [59 S.Ct. 442, 83 !LEd. 455],
where it was said that the traditional limitations on inquiry
on habeas eorpus may, in some situations, ''yield to exceptional
circumstances where the need for the remedy afforded by the
writ of habeas corp11s is apparent." The court there determined that the important and unanswered conflict then existing between federal and state authorities concerning the
purely legal question of their respective claims to jurisdiction
over a national park constituted sneh '' exrrptional circumstances.''
The trial eourt reeord there showed that the murder had
been committed "on the Government Reservation kllown as
the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park within the
exterior limits of the State of Georgia''
21) ; and ''The
sole question was whether this Park wafl within the rxelusive
jurisdiction of the United States"
23). 'l'he question of
jurisdiction was therefore a "question of law" (p. 27) rather
than of fact. as it depended solely ''upon the terms of the
consent or cession given by the legislature of Georgia,'' of

858
which
had

discussion in that caRe of the de(·isi<ms in
supm, 212 U.S.
Rodman v. Pothir:r, supra, 264 U.S.
and lValsh v. Archer, supra, 78 1''.2d 197,
that
the court did not intend to
the
rule established
by those decisions.
supra, 144 F.2d
862, 868.)
Similarly, the
Van
221 F.
was found to
"
circumstances" in that
long after
's conviction in the state court of South
Dakota, the United States Supreme Court had determined
as a matter of' law, eontrary io the prim· determinatiorlR of the
courts of Sm1th Dakota and other
that Indian
allotments hdd in trust outside of Indian rpservations had at
all times been within the mPardng of '' IJ1(1ian
''
that term was used in the federal statutes. As the
said
at page 971," f T] he recent determination of the
her(;
inYolved by the Supreme Court of the United States in
U.S. v.
snpra [282 G.S. 442
S.Ct.
58 L.Ed.
676)], at variance with the rule announced
Court of the state on
his
constitutes exceptional circumstanc·es, and
issnance of the writ . . . . " It is apparent that the instant case
involves no such exceptional circumstances as were
m
Bowen v. Johnston, supra, and Ex parte Van
Contrary to petitioner's claim the cases of In re
29 Ca1.2d 294 [176 P.2d 24], and In re
29 Cal.2d
264 [176 P.2d 40], lend no support to his position. Neither
of these cases involved an attack upon a final
of
conviction but were concerned only with the
of
habitual criminal status. This court
the distinetion when it said in In t·e Seeley, s1tpra, at page
in referring to the decision in In re -~1cViclcers, supra: "Iu that
case it was held that an adjudication of habitual criminal
status is not a judgment of conviction but
in effect,
an
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determination of a fact
to
to
and hence
characterized by
of conviction.''
as we have
claims of la<~k
similar to those here involved
d'h"'""·- has contested
on the
due process of law at his trial.
as appears from the cited
refused to redetermine quesor the locus of the crime on the
on the face of the trial eourt
have shown a willingness to look to evidence
dehors the record where a petitioner has claimed that he has
been denied his fundamental constitutional rights. (See
304 U.S. 458 [58 S.CL 1019, 82 I.1.Ed. 1461,
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 [55 S.Ct.
98 A.L.R
; l11oore v. Dempsey, 261
67 L.Ed. 543]; Frank v. Mangurn, 237
S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969] ; see also United States
ex rei. McCann v.
320 U.S. 220 [64 S.Ct. 14, 88 hEel.
V.
316 u.s. 101
S.Ct. 964, 86 L.Ed.
It therefore appears that both reason and authority supthe view that no
circumstances are presented
here and that our inquiry in this proceeding is limited to the
record of the trial court in ·which the final judgments of conviction were entered. Having concluded that we may not
here consider new and additional facts concerning the jurisdiction of the
Court of Madera County over the
offenses of which petitioner was convicted, it follows that petitioner's allegation arP immffieient to entitle him to any relief
in this
The writ is discharged and petitioner is remanded to ens-

C.

J., and McComb, J., concurred.

CARTER, J.~I dissent.
The conclusion reached by the majority here is predicated
upon the assumption that the scope of review on habeas corpus
in a case such as this is limited to matters appearing upon
the face of the record and that a reviewing court may not

f\60
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consider
facts al1:nndc the record 0ven though such
facts are conclusively established and it appears beyond doubt
that the tribunal whose judgment is
to review was
without jurisdiction to hear and determine the cause and
render the judgment which is the subject of review in the
habeas corpus proceeding. In so
the majority has
or misapplied several recent decisions both by this
court and by the
Court of the United States in which
relief was obtained by means of habeas corpus where the inquiry extended beyond the record on which the judgment
subject to review was based.
The most recent of these cases is that of Chessman v. Te.ets,
354 U.S. 156 [77 S.Ct. 1127, 1 L.Ed.2d 1253], decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States on June 10, 1957.
The background of the Chessman case should be well known
to every member of this court. It will be remembered that
on the 21st day of May, 1948, Chessman was found guilty of
17 felonies by a jury in the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County and on June 25, 1948, sentence of death was pronounced against him. The court reporter who reported the
proceedings at the trial died after only 646 out of 1,810 pages
of the trial transcript had been dictated into a recording
machine. Thereafter the deputy district attorney who prosecuted Chessman arranged with one Stanley Fraser who was
an uncle of the '>Yife of the said deputy district attorney to
transcribe the remaining notes of the deceased reporter. 'fhe
purported transcription of these notes extended over several
months and finally a purported reeord \vas submitted to tlw
trial court, and in the absence of Chessman or his counsel,
testimony was offered on behalf of the prosecution with respect to the accuracy of said record which was finally approved by the trial judge. 'l'he proceedings for the settlement
of said record were attacked by Chessman before both the
trial court and this f:ourt, but this court affirmed the order
of the trial court on May 19, 1950, with two justices dissenting (People v. Chessman, 35 Cal.2d 455 [218 P.2d 769, 19
A.L.R.2d 1084]). 'I'hereafter the ease was presented to this
court on the record so approved and the judgment of death
pronounced against Chessman was affirmed with the same two
justices dissenting (People v. Chessman, 38 Cai.2d 166 [238
P.2d 1001] ). Petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States was thereafter denied (Chessman v. California, 343 U.S. 915 [72 S.Ct. 650, 96 L.Ed. 1330]). Thereafter, and on July 16, 1954, Chessman presented to this court
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a
for a writ of habeas corpus on the
that
he was denied due process of law because of fraud perpetrated
by the prosecution in the transcription and settlement of said
alleging in his said petition certain facts which were
not known to him at the time the other proceedings above
mentioned were before this court. 'l'his court denied said petition on
21, 1954, and certiorari to the Supreme Court
of the United States was later denied without prejudice to
Chessman applying for a writ of habeas corpus to a federal
district court (Chessman v.
348 U.S. 864 l75 S.Ct.
85, 99 r_..Ed. 681] ). He later applied to the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California, SouthPrn Division, alleging substantially the same facts which were
rontained in his application for habeas corpus to the Supreme
Court of California. This application was summarily denied
by Judge Goodman of the United States District Court, and
his decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit (Chessman v. Teets, 221 F.2d 276).
The Supreme Court of the United States thereafter reversed
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and Judge Goodman and
directed that Chessman be given a hearing on his application
(Chessman v. Teets, 350 U.S. 3 [76 S.Ct. 34, 100 L.Ed. 4]).
He was thereafter given a hearing by Judge Goodman who
denied him any relief and Jndge Goodman's decision was affirmed by the United States Conrt of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, one judge dissenting (Chessman v. Teets, 239 F.2d 205).
Thereafter the Supreme Conrt of the United States granted a
writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for
the 9th Circuit, and on Jnne 10, 1957, reversed the decision of
the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals and ,Tndge Goodman, holding
squarely that Chessman had been denied dne process of law
by the proceeding in the trial court which purported to settle
thr rceord on which this court affirmed his conviction. The
rffeet of this decision is to render null and void, not only
,Judge Goodman's decision, but the order of the state trial
eourt approving the trial record and all of the decisions of
this court in denying Chessman re1ief.
In its opinion the Snpreme Court of the United States
declared: On October 17, 1955, this Court, reversing the
Court of Appeals, remanded to the District Court for a hearing petitioner's application for a writ of habeas corpus, charging fraud in the preparation of the state conrt record, which
had been summarily dismissed by the District Court. 350
U.S. 3 (76 S.Ct. 34, 100 L.Ed. 4J. This resulted in the judg-

ficers c-oncerned

dispute at the trial, and
already
related to some of that

tain during the settlement
"Under the cirnunstanees whieh haYe benn summarized.
\Ye must holrl that the
settlement of this state court
record violated
duPe process . . . .
''ln view of our
oursdvPs
hol(l
ihat
<~onrlnded hy the California
thr record on which it acted \Yas
as a mattrr of
state
and
in any
the inaccuracirs then elaimerl
the 1wtitioner >Yould not have
the result of his
appeal. Petitioner is entitled to have his eorJYiction rrYirwN1
upon a reeord \Yhich has been settled in aceonia nee with proeednra1 dnr proeess. 11loreovc1·, in
as it did tlw sfatr
conrt u·rts Jloi
the
lnfrT
in b
Jw.lffl'
thai those

Conrt 's
d0nials
9fl LE(1. G1G]; :!11 F
soo, H5 ILEa. J
; :l4:l n
01
R.n.
1380] 346 TT.R. 9H5 [74 S.Ct. 278. 98 LEd.
864 [75 S.Ct.
99 hBd. 6811. do not for('e1ose us from now

granting appropriate

Brown

Y.

344

r

tf43
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~13
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Court
wurt
the SuUnited States
case it is
Cour-t considered numerous facts
both of the trial court and this
considered
the

uc~•Hv·u arises as to what
due process.'' There can be no quesone of the essential elements of "prou•dural due
' is a tribunal which has the power to hear
and determine the
of the
(11 Cal.Jur.2d p.
§ 313 et seq.), and since '
due process" may
be established
of facts outside of the
it must
follow that a reviewing court may resort to facts
outside of the record for the purpose of determining whether
or not the tribulla1 rendering the
sought to be reviewed had
of the subject matter of the litigation.
TIH•rc ean be no eseape from this conclusion in view of the
of the
Court of the United States
iu the recent ease of Johnson v.
304 U.S. 458, 41.i5,
S.Ct.
82 I.~.Eti. 14Gl, 146 A.LR.
, whereiu it was declared: "True, habeas corp1ts cannot be used as a
means of
errors of law and
~nthe
of jurisd£ction-occurring during the
course of trial; and the 'writ of lwbcas corpus eannot be used
as a \Yrit of error.' [Woolsey v. Best, 299 U.S. 1, 2 (57 S.Ct.
2, 81 LEd.
.] These principles, bmvever, must be construed and
so as to preserve-Hot destroy~eonstitutional
of human life and liberty. The scope of
in habeas corpus proceedings has been broadenednot narrowed-since the adoption of the Sixth .Amendment.
In such a
'it would be clearly erroneous to conthe
to the
ancZ .fudgment of the tr·ial
court' [F'rank v. Mangum, 2i37 U.S. 309, i327 (35 S.Ct. 582,
59 hE d.
l and the
court has 'power to inquire
w£th
to !he
the
either
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ma.tter m· to the person, even zf such
an e:mminaJion
outside
the record.'
141

but not inconsistent
U.S.
116 [11 S.C;i
131 U.S. 280 [9 S.Ct.
has expanded the
of a
for habeas corpus
U.S.C.,
ch.
§
and the ' . . . effeet is to substitute for
the bare
have been the limit of
under the common-law
and under
the Act of 31 Car. II, c. 2, a more
investigation,
in which the applieant is put npon his oath to set forth the
truth in the matter respecting the causes of his detention,
and the court, upon determining the actual facts, is to ''dispose of the party as law and justice require."
'' 'There being no doubt of the authority of the Congress
to thus liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus
in order to safeguard the liberty of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States against infringement through
any violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty established
thereunder, it results that nuder the sections cited a prisoner
in custody pursuant to the final judgment of a state court of
crimina] jurisdiction may have a judieial inquiry in a court
of the United States into the very truth and substanee of the
eauses of his detention, although it may become necessary
to look behind and beyond the record
his conviction to a
sufficient extent to test the jun:sdict~:on of the state court to
proceed to a judgment against him. . . .
'' ' . . . it is open to the courts of the United States upon
an application for a writ of habeas corpus to look beyond
forms and inquire into the very substance of the matter,
' " (Emphasis added.) Frank v. JJ1angum, 237 U~S.
309, 327 r35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 9691; Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86 [43 S.Ct. 265, 67 I-l.Ed. 548/; Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103 [55 S.Ct. 340, 79 hEd. 791, 98 A.hR. 406]; Hans
Nielsen, Petitioner, 131 U.S. 176 rg S.Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed.
118]. The court eonelnded with the statement that "The
judgment of conviction pronounced by a cotrrt without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain
release by habeas corptlS. A judge of the United States-to
whom a petition for habeas corpus is addressed-should be
alert to examine 'the facts for himself when if true as alleged
they make the trial absolutely void.' " (Moore v. Dempsey,
261 U.S. 86, 92 [43 S.Ct. 265, 67 L.Ed. 543] ; Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 313 [50 S.Ct. 253, 74 hEd. 854,
70 A.L.R. 263] .)
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in the case at bar is in direct
of the
which was

must exist berecord may be
habeas
grounn that the federal district
to
the petitioner for
murder 'l'he
's allegation was that the federal
court did not have jurisdiction to
him. The United States
Court held that the requirement that a litigant resort
procedure ''is not a rule denying the power to
issue a writ of habeas corpus when it appears that nevertheless the trial court >vas without jurisdiction. '!'he rule is
not one defining pmver but one which relates to the approexercise of power.'' The court then proceeded to
elaborate by showing· that the same eircumstances were present there that we have in the case at bar. lt was said:" [T]he
rule is not so inflexible that it may not yield to exceptional
circumstances where the need for the reme(1y afforded by
the writ of habeas corpus is apparent. ..Among these exceptional circtrm.~tances are those
a conflict between
authorities on a question of law involving
state and
concerns of large importance affecting their respective juris" (Emphasis added.) In the Bovven case evidence
outside the record was apparently considered inasmuch as
the distriet court which had tried petitioner had given no
eonsiJeration to the jurisdictional question since as the court
stated ''The matter stood without any judicial explanation
and without appeaL" (P. 27.) It therefore clearly appears
that the so-caHed "exceptional circumstances" present in
the Bowen case are also present in the rase under coHsideration.
In Waley v. Johnston (1942), 316 U.S. 101, 104 [62 S.Ct.
964, 86 IJ.Ed. 1302], habeas corpus was granted on evidence
outside the record. The court said: ''The issue here [whether
petitioner's plea o£ guilty had been coerced] was appropriately raised by the habeas corpus petition. The facts relied
on are dehors the record and their effect on the judgment was
not open to consideration ancl rcv'iew on appeal.'' (Emphasis
added.)
Tn United States f:J.' rel. liicCann v. Adams (HI4;j), :120 U.K
48

C.2d~-28
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S.Ct. 14, 88 hEd. 4], habeas corpus was granted
';;;
that be had not
waived
his right to eonnfi('l and a
trial. 'l'lw court Haid: "That the
msne
lw wain•d his right to eounsel and
trial],
now
tendered
the
habeas corpus below,
has never been adjudieated on its merits by the lower courts.
But it is no
·within the bosom of the trial court. Nor
can it be disposed of on
of his
the claim
rests on rnaterial dehors the trial
" (Emphasis
added.) Once again it is apparent that evidence outside
the record may be considered on a petition for habeas corpus.
In illoure v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
87, 90 [ 43 S.Ct. 265,
G7 L.Ed. 54:l] (de(·.ided in 192:3 and before the Johnson
case, 304 1J.S. 458 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 hEd. 1461, 146 A.L.R.
:!57]) habeas eorpus was granted on evideuce outside the
record on petitioners' allegation that they had been denied
due process of law because their convictions of murdering
a white man had been obtained through mob pressure at a
trial which lasted three-quarters of an hour.
In Frank v. ,Mangum (1915), 237 U.S. 309, 326, 331 [35
S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969], habeas corpus was denied on the
ground that the state court's prior determination of the
truth of petitioner's allegations was conclusive. It was held,
however, that a court of competent jurisdiction was an essential element of due process; and that while evidence outside
the record could not be considered at common law, the scope
of review had been broadened. '['he c-ourt stated: ''There
being JJO doubt of the authority of the Congress to thus
liberalize the common law procedure on habeas corpus in
order to safeguard the liberty of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States against the infringement through
any violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty established
thereunder, it results that under the sections cited a prisoner
in custody pursuant to the final judgment of a state eourt
of criminal jurisdiction may have a judicial inquiry in a
court of the United States into the very truth and substance
of the cause of his detention although it may become necessary to look behind and beyond the record of his conviction
to a suffieient extent to test the jurisdiction of the state court
to proceed to judgment against him." It was also held that
"In the light, then, of these established rules and prineiples:
that due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment had regard to substance of right, and not to matters of
form and procedure : that it is open to the courts of the
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United States npon an
for a writ of habeas corpus
to look
tlJC forms and
into the very substance
the matter
. whether
·in the record or
not . . . . "
As to the <>nrnYnn on the part of the
to distinguish
that certain specified rights such as
and a conviction under an unconstitutional law, is concerned, it should be
specifically noted that in the ease of Johnson v.
304
U.S. 458
S.Ct. 1019, 82 hEd. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357], the
court emphatically held that the right to counsel was Jurisdictional, and that when a "jurisdictional question" was
involved" 'it would be clearly erronrons to eonfine the inquiry
to the proc.reding~-; and judgment of the trial court.' "
In the ease of 'l'ooisuah v. Uniterl States, 186 F.2d 93,
which the majority holds is "not helpful" to Carmen, the
question of jurisdiction of the federal distriet court had been
raised at the trial and affirmed on appeal. On a collateral
attack on the judgment of convietion based on the ground
that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction because the land
on which the crime had been committed was not "Indian
country," the court reversed its former decision and remanded
the cause with direetions to vacate the judgment and dismiss
the indictment. It was held that "The question is one of law
whether the agreed and adjudieated facts bring the offense
within that class over which exelusive federal jurisdiction is
extended by statute. Since tl1e motion goes squarely to the
jurisdiction of the court on agreed facts; involves human
liberties, as well as a possible eonflict between state and
federal jurisdiction over crimes eommitted within the boundaries of a sovereign state; and since the question of Jurisdiction was not presented or painstakingly considered in the
direct appeal, we deem it appropriate to re-examine it here."
(Emphasis added.) On the direct appeal from the judgment
of conviction Carmen, in the case at bar, tried unsuccessfully,
to raise the question of jurisdiction. A majority of this court
refused his application but intimated that he might have another remedy. The majority seeks to distinguish the Toosigah
case on the ground that "no new or additional facts" were
sought to be injeeted into the ease and "no adjudicated facts
. . . sought to be impeadwd." Davis v. Johnston, 144 F.2d
862, is not like the ease at bar. 'rh<>re the petitioner for a writ
of habeas corpus had been tried by the federal district eourt
and that court's jurisdiction had been in issue and directly

C.2d

in the lower court and a """"u"'
In the case at bar the state court assumed
this court would not
the question of lack of
In Matter
197 U.S. 488
, the
of habeas corpus because there was a direct conflict between
the state and local federal courts on the
Court in

on its
in the Neff case
202 U.S. 178, 183 [26 S.Ct.
50 L.Ed.
, saicl that the Conrt of .r\ppeals in the Neff ease "had
deeided the
to the contention ol:
petitioner, so that a writ of error feom that court would hav(•
ae<•omplished nothing; and
, that the maltm· invoi15Pd
up
into
the
.iurisdieUons
over
numbers
Indians. There were special reasons,
therefore, for our issuing a writ of habeas corpus and investigating the matter in that ease." (Emphasis added.) It >vas
coneluded that it ''ould be '' ms~umed that the trial courts
will follow the rulings of this
and if there be in any
ease a departure therefrom the proper appellate court will
correct the error." In Toy 'l'oy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542, 549
[29 S.Ct. 416, 53 L.Ed. 644], the Supreme Court, quoting from
Louisville Trust Co. v. Corningor, 184 U.S. 18, 25
S.Ct.
293, 46 L. Ed. 413], said: "Jurisdiction as to the subjectmatter may be limited in various ways, as to civil and criminal cases; cases at common law or in equity or in admiralty;
probate cases, or cases under special statntes; to particular
classes of persons ; to proceedings in particular modes ; and
so on. In many cases jurisdiction may depend on the ascertainment of facts involving the merits, and in that sense the
eonrt exercises jurisdiction in disposing of the
inquiry, although the result may he that it finds that it c~annot
go farther. And where, in a ease like th<l t before us, the court
PrToneously retains jurisdiction to adjndieate the merits, it:;;
aetion ean he eorreeted on review." (And see United States
v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 [27 S.Ct. 165, 51 I_~.Ecl. 319] .)
So far as the rule in this state is eoneerned, T r1ad thought
it settled by In rc Bell, 19 Ca1.2d
501 [122 P.2d
that a "petitioner seeking habeas rorpnN, ho-vvever, is not
(•onfined to the faee of the reeord in atten1
to sustain
the burden of proving that his conviction was in violation
of his constitutional rights. The courts of both the United
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of habeas
corpus
an examination not only of the actual evidence
introduced at petitioner's trial but of any necessary additional
evidence
upon the infringement of petitioner's constitutional
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
S.Ct.
67 L.Ed.
v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103
S.Ct.
79 L.Ed.
98 A.L.R. 406]; Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 242
S.Ct. 732, 81 L.Ed. 1066] ; Johnson v. Zerbst,
In re Connor, 15 Cal.2d 161 [99 P.2d 248]; In re
16 Cal.App.2d 709 [61 P.2d 490]; In 1·e Lake, 65
420 [224 P. 126] In re Chaus, 92 Cal.App. 384 [268
; see, also, F'·iske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 [47 S.Ct. 655,
71 L.Ed. 1108]; DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 [57 S.Ct.
255, 81 L.Ed. 278]; Nm·ris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 [55 S.Ct.
79 L.Ed. 1074]; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 [53
S.Ct.
77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R. 527] .) This examination is
made, not to pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdict, but to determine what the verdict actually
was, so that the court may decide whether it violates constitutional guaranties. Such an examination will be made in a
habeas corpus proceeding whenever a petitioner has been
deprived of due process of law, whatever form that deprivation
has taken." We also said (In re Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701, 712,
713 [108 P.2d 10]) that we had the right, on habeas corpus,
to
into jurisdictional facts whether they appear on
the face of the record or not and that the scope of the in'' embrace additional evidence received by this
court either directly or under an order of reference. (In 1·e
Mooney, 10 Cal.2d 1 [73 P.2d 554].)"
It has been held that jurisdiction of a subject matter over
which a court has otherwise no jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, stipulation (Abalian v. Townsend Social
Inc., 112 Cal.App.2d 441 [246 P.2d 965] ; Miller v.
·Miller, 52 CaLApp.2d 443 [126 P.2d 357], agreement (Fletcher
v. Superior Court, 79 Cal.App. 468 [250 P. 195] ), acquiescence
(Fang Chuck v. Chin Po Foon, 29 Cal.2d 552 [176 P.2d 705] ),
silence (Tennesen v. Prudential Ins. Co., 8 Cal.App.2d 160
[47 P.2d 1066]), appearance (Sampsell v. Superior Court,
32 Cal.2d 763 [197 P.2d 739] ), or estoppel (More Estate, 143
Cal. 493
P. 407] ). Jurisdiction of the subject matter
in any proeeeding is eonferred by law, and cannot be given,
enlarged, or waived by the parties (Harrington v. Superior
Court, 194 Cal. 185 [228 P. 15]). 'l'his means that where
there is a want of jurisdiction of the subject matter, a pur-
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matt('!' may be raised at any time. ln 14 American
,Jurisprudence,
section
the foltribunals havn 110
mattrr ou vrhid1
as:o;nme to
their
are
absolutely void in the strictest sense of the term and a eoul't
wbich is
to deeide on its own jurisdietiou in a
given case may determine that
at any time in the
proceedings of the eause, \rhenever that fact is made to appear
to its satisfaetion, either before or after judgment. Accordmay
ingly, an objeetiou for want of' jurisdieiion, if it
be raised
answer or at any subsequent
of the proceedings; in fad, it may be raised for tlw first time on appeaL
A court will
want of jurisdietion over the subject
matter even if no objection is made. 'f'herefore, 'Whenever a
want of juri:-:;dietiou is
by the court's examination
of the case or
it is the duty of the court to consider
it, for if the court is without jurisdiction, it is powerless to
aet in the ease.
''A plaintiff against whom judgment went in the lower
t~ourt may on appeal raise the
of the jurisdiction of
the trial court and have the judgment reversed if the court
did not have jnrisdietion of the subjcet
although the
assmnption of jurisdiction was to his advantage.
"As heretofore show11, the jurisdiction of a court over the
subjeet matter of a canse of action may be conferred by law,
and it eanuot u ncler any eireumstanee be conferred on a court,
as such, by the consent of the parties. It naturally follows
that if j urisdietion cannot be conferred by consent, the want
thereof eannot be waived
any aet of the parties.''
'fhe same rule appears in 13 California J urispruclenee 2d,
Courts, seetion 86, page 597: "\Vhere a judieial tribunal has
uo jurisdiction of the subject matter on whieh it assumes
to ad, its rn·oeeedings are absolutely void in the fullest sense
of the term; and a (:ourt, being eompetcut to determine its
own jurisdictioll, may determine that question at any time
in the proceedings, whenever that fad is made to appear to
its satisfaetion, either before or after judgment Aeeordingly,
an objection for want of such jurisdiction may be raised by
answer or at any subsequent stage of the proceedings; in fact
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it may be raised for the first time on
16 CaL 53:1; Creditors v. Consumers'
[ 33 P. 196] iVI astick v.
869)
In rc, 101 CaL ~:l4D
People v. Oakland !Vater Pront
San
Sav. Ban!c v.
'' i'1. <~ourt should
subjeet matter even if no
ever a want of j uri~dietion is
nation of the case m· oth
it is the
consider
for if the court is without jurisdietion it is powerJrss to act in the ease. So fnn.lamental is the necessity that
a eourt have jnrisdietion of the
matter, that a lar:k
thereof may be raised on appeal or in another proceeding,
even by the party who invoked the jurisdiction in the first
place." (Emphasis add eel.)
In irlatson
Co. v. Uuitcd States, 284 U.S. 352
, a <'Hsr arising nnd0r the .Ad[52 S.Ct. 162, 7G hE(!.
miralty Act where exelnsivc jmisdiction was vested in the
federal courts, the eo art said: ''.As the want of jurisdietion
is of tbc sn bject matter, it may be eonsic!ered, and appropriate
judgment given, at any stage of the proceedings, either here
or below. Hilton v. Dick1:nson, lOS U.R. JG5, 168 [2 S.Ct. 424,
27 L.Ed. G8S]; Gaines1:ille v. Bl'lnon-Crummcr lnv. Co., 277
U.S. 54, 5fJ I 48 S.Ct.
72 LEd. 7811. S('(' Orace v. Amerimn Centrol Ins. Co., JO!J U.S.
28:3-281 [:3 S.Ct. 207, 27
LEd. D32] ; Bars v. Preston, 111 U.S.
255 14 S.Ct. 407,
28 L.Ed. 419]."
In Uainesm:lle v. Brown-Crummer lnv. Co., 277 U.S. 54,
58, 59 [48 S.Ct. 4?54, 72 J~.Bd. 781], the ease had been tried
and appealed in the federal conris. The ease went up on
eertiorari to the United States Supreme Court. That court
said: "Objection is first made by the petitioner that there
was no separable controversy and so no [federal] jurisdiction.
This question does not seem to have been presented to and
was certainly not considered by the Circuit Cmrrt of Appeals."
(Emphasis added.) After noting that the question of jurisdiction would seem to have been "abandoned until it is now
renewed in the briefs in this Court,'' the court said: ''Of
course a question of jurisdiction ean not be waived. Jurisdiction should
appear, and the question may be
raised at any tirnc. Grace v. American Central Ins. Co., 109
U.S. 278, 283 [3 S.Ct. 207, 27 hEd. fl82] Mansfield, C. &:
L. JYI. R. Co. v.
J 11 U.S.
882
S.Ct. 510, 28
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L.Ed.
U.S.
added.)
Rayna Tom Carmen was found
of the first
murder of ·wilbur Dan McSwain and with assault with intent
to murder Alvin
\Vilbur's brother. On
this court
v.
36 Cal.2d 768
P.2d
reversed the murder eonvietion and affirmed the conviction
of assault with intent to eommit murder.
Tom Carmen was found guilty
a jury of first
murder
without reeommcndation. The ;jndg:ment \Vas affirmed
this
eourt in August, J 954
v.
43 Ca1.2d 342 127:)
P.2d
).
On appeal, defenclant sought to show by the production
of additional evidence that both he and the deceased, vVilbur
Dan MeSwain, were Indians and that the crime oceurred
in "Indian eonntry." It was, and is, defendant's
that the above facts vest exelusive jurisdiction in the federal
courts. In the majority opinion in People v. Cannen, 43 Cal.
2rl a42, 348 [273 P.2d 521], it was lwld: "We have concluded
that the proposed offer to produce additional evidence on the
appeal should be denied. l~'urthermore, even
that
additional evidence could be received on appeal in this cla>~s
of cases by stipulation or otherwise, the facts stated in the
so-ealled 'stipulation' as well as shown in the entire record
are insufficient to show exclusive jurisdidion in the federal
eourts." It 1vas also said (at page 349) : "The evidence presented at the trial is not sufficient to
a determination
that there is exclusive federal jurisdiction in the present ease,
and we do not pass on the question of what remedies may be
available to the defendant to show alleged lack of jurisdiction
in the state court.''
After the filing of the opinion in the above mentioned case
and a denial of a petition for a rehearing therein, Carmen
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which he raised
the question of lack of jurisdiction in the
eourts
and contended that exclusive jurisdiction was in the federal
courts. This court issued a writ of habeas corpus returnable
in San Francisco on December 8, 1954.
State ex rei. Dtt Fault v. Utecht., 220 Minn. 4al
N.W.2d
706, 161 A.L.R. 1316], is relied upon heavily by the People
for the proposition that unless the court's lack of jurisdiction
is clear and undisputable from the face of the record, habeas
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to review an erroneous deterit has territorial
over an
for habeas corpus
writ of error or
""''u'"'"' features
and the Utecht case.
jurisdiction on
Carmen in the instant case; secondly, while
the crime was committed ( acupon an Indian allotment for which a
trust
been issued. The crime in the Carmen case
committed on the
,Jim Allotment but the land
that time still held in trust by the United States government and no fee patent had been issued. (It was issued, subseto the
in 1952.)
While it is difficult to ascertain the exact holding in the
Utecht case, the following statement (page 707) appears to
that had no fee patent been issued, a different soluhave been reached: ''The
set out in petit he writ of habeas corpus, if true,
the state courts of ju.risdiction in this matter.
·u:n,su,·'·"''"'"n does not extend over individual members
an Indian tribe in so-called 'Indian country.' State v.
218 Minn. 429 [16 N.W.2d 752] . . . .
' 'In the original proceedings before the district court of
Carlton
tlJere is no reference to the fact that the place
where the crime was committed was within an Indian reservation on an Indian allotment, and no reference to the fact that
relator is a member of the Chippewa tribe of Indians and a
ward of the government, except that at the pre-sentence
examination relator was asked by the court :
" 'Let's Ree: Do you belong to the Chippewa tribe: A.
Yes.' "
The Utecht case was, apparently, decided on the theory
that defendant should have brought the court's lack of jurisdiction
this is dubious since the crime was committed on land to which a patent in fee had been issued and
was,
no longer Indian country) to the attention of the
court on appeaL Utecht did not perfect an appeal. Carmen
to have the matter determined on appeal. It will be
recalled that a majority of this court determined ( 43 Cal.2d
that Carmen's" proposed offer to produce additional evi-
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deuce on the appeal should be denied. Furthermore, even
that additional evidence eould be reeeived on appeal
in this claf'is of cases
stipulation or otherwise, the facts
stated in the so-called 'stipulation' as WPll as shown in the
entire record are insufficient to show exclusive jurisdiction
in the federal courts. . . .
''The evidence presented at the trial is not sufficient to
a determination that there is exclusive federal jurisdiction in the present case, and we do not pass on the question of
what remedies may be available to the defendant to show
lack of jurisdiction in the state court. Nothing in
the record indicates that the location of the crime was 'Indian
eonntry' within the meaning of any of the statutPs whieh have
been cited. (See e.g., 18 U.S.O. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153, and 3242.)
While there was evidence that defendant and the victim were
"'-'-"··'-'"•H"'·' the use of this term, without more, shows only that
the persons were Indians by race and blood.'' (Emphasis
added.) We know, therefore, that the fact that defendant and
the decease-d were both Indians appeared on the face of the
record.
It is of interest to note that in the courts of the United
States (see discussion, supra), there may be a judicial inquiry
into the very truth and substance of the causes of a defendant's
detention although it may become necessary to look behind
and beyond the record of his conviction to a sufficient extent
to test the jurisdiction of the state court to proceed to a judgment against him. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 466-468
[58 S.Ot. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 146 A.L.R. 357]; Wong Doo v.
United States, 265 U.S. 239 [44 S.Ot. 524, 68 L.Ed. 999];
Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 [44 S.Ot. 519, 68 L.Ed. 989].)
'l'he Utecht case, while factually very similar, has really
no application to the case at bar. A_ majority of this court
refused to perrnit Carmen to produce additional evidence on
appeal on the q7wstion of jurisdiction of the subject rnatter;
there was no appeal in the Utecht case where that court held
the question of jurisdiction should have been considered. The
crime in the Carmen case was committed in Indian country;
in the Utecht case, a patent in fee had been issued (see the
various cases cited infra holding that an Indian is emancipated
when he has received a patent in fee to land; and section 349,
title 25, U.S.O.A., which provides that when the lands have been
so eonveyed ''then ead1 and every allottee shall have the beneflt of and be subjeet to thE· laws, both (·ivil and eriminal, of the
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in which they may
") Tn
lVI:imwso1a there is an appral from the denial of a
ticlll for
a writ of habeas corpus and there may not be successive
tions for the writ on the same set of facts. Such is not the
Jaw in California.
In Stafp, ex rel. Irvine v. District Court, 125 :lVIont. 398
P.2d 272,
, the accused was an Indian. The crime of
burglary committed on an Indian reservation was involved.
The Montana court held that it had no jurisdiction in that
exclusive jurisdiction was in the federal courts; that defendant was an Indian and a ward of the government. It was
held that the question of jurisdiction "should be inquired into
by the court at the earliest inception on its own initiative
to a:-wPrtain whether that rmrtienlar eonrt has jurisdietion of
that elass of offense. In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731, 758 r8 S.Ct.
1263, 32 I1.Ed. 274]; Barnes v. Hunter, 10
188 F.2d
89; Tooisgah v. United States, 10 Cir., 186 F.2d 93, 96.
"It should be kept in mind that all congressional
relative to Indians and Indian affairs has been initiated and
enacted for the benefit of the Indian. As was stated
the
supreme court, 'According to a familiar rule. legislation affecting the Indians is to be construed in their interest, and
a purpose to make a radical departure is not lightly to be
inferred.' United States v. Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 599, 600 [36
S.Ct. 696, 698, 60 L.Ed. 1192].
'' 'The policy of leaving Indians free from state jurisdiction and control is deeply rooted in the Nation's history.'
Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786 [65 S.Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 13671."
It was also held that "Exclusive jurisdiction over the Indian
for this purpose has always been claimed and asserted by
the general government, on the ground that the Indian is a
ward thereof, and dependent thereon, and until fully emancipated and discharged from that condition, Title 25, § 349,
U.S. C.A., the federal government continues to assert its exl'lHsive jurisdiction to punish its ward for the eommitting
of the enumerated offenses."
With the above rules in mind, on May 26, 1955, this court
made an order of reference propounding certain questions
to counsel for petitioner Carmen and the attornry general.
Pursuant to said order, hearings were held and
taken at Sacramento on December J4, 19;)5. at Madera on
F1 ebruary 20, 1956, aud at San Quentin on F'elH'nary 23. 1956.
On May 17, 1956, the referee, the Honorable ,John P. lVIcl\Iur-
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ray,
filed with this court the
'' 1. Did
Tom Carmen and
to a tribe or tribes of Indians
and character of the tribal
"Your Referee finds that
Tom
Dan McSwain did
to a tribe of Luuuu1"
Mono Indians who live in the North
in this state.
''The
nature and character
tion to which these men
was
organization which, however, has its O\Yll
the main
tribal feature
(•eremony upon the
'rhe tribe is divided into two
If a
the Eagles render certain
at his funeral and vice versa. The squaws, if a member of the
family dies, cut their hair short during the funeral. The
funeral consists in a celebration of several
which
there is a great deal of crying and some
the funeral ceremony the members of the
ceased abstain from eating meat or greasy
four hours and before a second ceremony
pants in the ceremony wash their faees with a gray odoriferous
weed which is called 'sorrop' in the Mono
members of the tribe still weave baskets of distinctive designs and usc the rradleboard of 'hoops' in which to carry
babies. ThPR(~ erad1Pboards are \YOY011 in such a mannn
as to allow the sex of the child to be put on the
after
the child is born. The child's sex is indicated
a tribal
pattern, one indieating that the baby is a
and the other
indicating that the baby is a girl. The members
fhe tribe
at times meet in order to raise money to
thPir intert>sts
as Indians. The meetings arc held as a tribal mattPr, but the
proteetion sought is as California
not as Mono
Indians. They also hold social gatherings several times a year
which are restricted to the members of the tribes. It is
tomary for members of the tribe to collect acorns
ground into flour and meal and are baked
bread.
also eonsider the butterfly worm as a delicate item
*A
of this court now neatly
Referee on
questions propounded by stating
to discuss the question of whether the evidence is
the findings.
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Dan
Bureau

was later removed in
with Indians listed
In order to be eligible for enrollment a
of ancestry which goes back to 1852.
purpose of this census roll is to determine eligibility
uc.ac1u;.;

either of them belonged to a tribe of Indians did
of them sever tribal relations or become otherwise
from his tribe~
"Neither of the named persons ever severed tribal relations
ber:amc otherwise emancipated from his tribe.
"4. Had the Department of Indian Affairs acted in any
way toward defendant Rayna Torn Carmen or the victim of
the
Wilbur Dan McSwain f
"The
of Indian Affairs appeared in the Supreme Court informally on behalf of defendant Hayna Tom
but there is no evidence that it at any time acted
in
way toward the victim of the homicide, Wilbur Dan
i\IcSwain. 1'he department collected and delivered to Carmen's mother his distributive share of a judgment obtained
for certain California Indians at a time after his conviction
which led to his present incarceration. Rayna Tom Carmen
also attended the Federal Indian School at Stewart, Nevada,
near Carson
a federally operated Indian school, and
went to the Sherman Institute, a federally operated Indian school in Riverside County, California.
'' 5. To what extent if any did the Department of Indian
Affairs exercise supervision over the place of abode or manner
in whieh these parties lived?
''The Department of Indian Affairs did not exercise any
over the place of abode or manner of life of
of the hearings on reference shows, at page 15, that
Dan
name was removed because of his death. His
death oerurred on April 22, 1950. An amendment was passed on May
1950 which provided that persons "must be living on the date of
Act in order to be enrolled."

C.2d
either of these
but there is testimony that it never
acts in such manner with any California Indians.
"6. Had there been any agreement between the United
States and the tribes to which they belonged 7
''There had 11ever been any agreement between the United
States and the tribe to which either of these parties belonged.
"7. Had either of these parties ever received an allotment
of laud be(•anse he \\·as an Juc!ian or of Indian clrseent? If RO,
what if any disposition has been made of such land~
"Neither party had ever received any allotment of land
lweause he was an Indian or of Indian descent.
110 disposition was ever made of any such land."
l\Ir. I-1inn, Assistant Attorney General, stipulated at the
first hearing on reference (page 3 of the transcript) that "the
Cnited States of Ameriea did, on November 26, 1920, issue an
allotment to the foregoing deseribed lands [where the crime
was eommittcd] to Maggie ,Jim, a Mono Indian, that said
deseribed lands at all times han been and are now* held in
trust by the United States of America." It was also stipulated
by counsel that this allotment was not part of, nor had it been
part of, an Indian reservation.
'l'he only real question here involved is whether the federal
government in 1950, the year in which the erime occurred,
had exclusive jurisdicton over erimes of this type in any case
involving Indians and Indian eountry. This question is also
bypassed by a majority of this court because of its holding
that laek of jurisdiction must appear on the face of the record
in order to entitle a petitioner to its benefits unless unusual
eircumstanecs appear and that there are no such unusual cireumstanees in the ease at bar. I have heretofore shown that
this eourt admitted ( 43 Cal.2d 342, 349) that "there was evidenee that defendant and the victim were 'Indians,' " and the
location of the crime was also in evidence at the time of trial
although it may not have been specifically referred to as
Indian Country it was referred to as the "Maggie Jim Allotment." I am of the opinion, therefore, that even by adopting
the restrictive rule of the seope of habeas corpus subscribed
to by the majority (and whieh, in my view, overrules the
more liberal and salutary rules of In re Bell, 19 Cal.2d 488
r 122 P.2d 22], and In re Connor, 16 Cal.2d 701 fJ08 P.2d
10]), Carmen was entitled to have the question of the juris* Subsequent to the crime, in IrJ52, ~ fpe patent to this land was
issued to D2n McSwain, the father of the victim Wilbur Dan Me·
Swain, and the husband of Maggie Jim.
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diction of the California court determined.
One is
deprived of a substantial constitutional right when be is
found guilty, and sentenced by a court having no jurisdiction of the subject matter!
Defendant argues that the state court was without
diction in this case and that exdusiye jurisdiction was vested
in the United States and its courts by reason of sections 1151,
1152, 1] 53, and 3242 of the United States Code Annotated, m;
amended May 24, 1949. (U.S.C.A., tit.
With this contention I agree.
Section 1151 provides as follows: ''Except as otherwise
provided in sections 1154 and 1156 of this title [those sections
haYe reference to sales of liquor to Indians and the definition
of the term 'Indian country' as it relates to the liquor laws],
the term 'Indian country,' as used in this chapter, means
all lands within the limits of any Indian reserYation under the
jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way
running through tl1e reservation, (b) all dependent Indian
communities within the borders of the United States whether
within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof,
and whether within or without the limits of a state, and
all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been
extinrJ1rished, including rights-of-way running through the
same." (Emphasis addrd; June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat.
757, amended May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 25, 63 Stat. 94.)
'raking the problem here involved step by step, it has been
stipulated that the crime was committed on an Indian allotment, the Indian title to which had not been extinguished at
the time of the crime. The People argue that in order for
such an allotment to come within the definition of "Indian
country" it must have been part, at one time, of an Indian
reserYation. This argument stems from House Report Number 314. 80th Congress, page 492, wherein it is stated that
Indian allotments were included in the definition of Indian
country on the authority of United States v. Pelican, 232
U.S. 442 [34 S.Ct. 396, 58 L.Ed. 676]. In the Pelican case, a
full blood Indian was murdered on land allotted to one Agnes,
an Indian. The allotment had formerly been part of the Colville Indian reservation which, with certain exceptions. had
lwen, by Art of CoJJgress (.Jnl.v 1. 1892, eh. 140. 27 Stat. 62)
yacated and restored to the public domain. The exc.eptions
were made by Congress to care for the Indians residing on
that portion of the reservation. Each Indian was entitled to

880

IN

RE CARMEN

select 80 acres which was allotted
him in
being held in trust for his benefit for 25
ferred in fee to him or his heirs.
lands were inalienable.
The People's
is that because
were once part of an Indian reservation
by the court to continue to be Indian
Court in the Pelican case had held that
was not Indian
within
The
Court reversed. It was said at
though the lands were allotted in
held in trust
the United States for 25
use and benefit of the allottee, or his
period were to be inalienable. That the
continued to be under the jurisdiction and control of
for all governmental purposes relating
the
and protection of the Indians, is not open
United States v. Rickert, 188 U.S.
437
L.Ed. 532] ; McKay v. Kalyton, 204
S.Ct. 346, 51 L.Ed. 566] ; Couture v. United
581 [28 S.Ct. 259, 52 L.Ed.
; United States v.
215 U.S. 278, 290, 291 [30 S.Ct. 93, 54 I_1.Ed.
; United
States v. Sutton, 215 U.S. 291 [30 S.Ct. 116, 54 r~.Ed.
Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest. Co., 221 U.S.
f31 S.Ct. 578, 55 L.Ed. 738] ; Hallowell v. United
U.S. 317 [31 S.Ct. 587, 55 L.Ed. 750]; UnUed States v.
229 U.S. 226, 237 [33 S.Ct. 630, 57 L.Ed.
"
further held (page 449) that ''The lands,
allotment, undoubtedly formed part of the
ras a reservation]' still retain during the trust
tinctively Indian character, being devoted to Indian occupancy under the limitations imposed
Federal
The explicit provision in the act of 1897, as to
do not regard as pointing a distinction, but rather as emout its
phasizing the intent of Congress in
with respect to allotments in severalty where these have been
accompanied with restrictions upon alienation or
for trusteeship on the part of the Government. In tl1e
case, the original reservation was Indian f'f\llnTP<r
cause it had been validly set apart for the use of the Indians
as such, under the superintendence of the Government. Donnelly v. United States, supra [228 U.S. 243
S.Ct.
57
L.Ed. 820, Ann. Case. 1913E 710)]. The same c,vuc:nu,L
in substance, apply to the allotted lands
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reservation was diminished, were excepted from the portion
restored to the public domain. The allottees were permitted
to
a more secure tenure, and provision was made for
their ultimate ownership without restrictions. But, meanthe lands remained Indian lands, set apart for Indians
under governmental care; and we are unable to find ground
for the conclusion that they became other than Indian country
through the distribution into separate holdings, the Government retaining control.
"It is said that it is not to be supposed that Congress
has intended to maintain the Federal jurisdiction over hundreds of allotments scattered through territory other portions
of which were open to white settlement. But Congress expressly so provided with respect to offenses committed in
violation of the act of 1897. Nor does the territorial jurisdiction of the United States depend upon the size of the particular
areas which are held for Federal purposes (Criminal Code,
§ 272). It must be remembered that the fundamental considerat£on is the protection of a dependent people." (Emphasis
added.) The court continued and after explicitly noting that
Congress amended the original act to provide "That until the
issuance of fee-simple patents all allottees to whom trust
patents shall hereafter be issued shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States" (section 349, title
2;), TT.S.C.A. continues to so providP) said: "We df'em it to
be clear that Congress had the power thus to continue the
guardianship of the Government. (Um:ted States v. Kagama,
118 U.S. 375, 383, 384 [6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228] ; United
States v. Celestine, supra; Marchie Tiger v. Western Invest.
Co., supra; HalloweU v. United States, supra; Heckman v.
United States, 224 U.S. 413, 437 [32 S.Ct. 424, 56 L.Ed. 820] ;
Ex parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663, 683 f32 S.Ct. 769, 56 L.Ed.
1248]; United States v. Wright, supra; United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 [34 S.Ct. 1, 58 L.Ed. 7] ; Perrin v. United
States, decided this day, post, p. 478 [232 U.S. 478 (34 S.Ct.
887, 58 L.Ed. 697)]); and these provisions leave no room for
doubt as to the intent of Congress with respect to the maintenance of the Federal jurisdiction over the allotted lands described in the indictment."
The foregoing quotations from the Pelican case show that
the case did not stand for the proposition that allotments
must be carved from Indian reservations before they could be
considered as falling within the definition of Indian country.
"It must be remembered that the fundamental consideration
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'' Section
is the protection of a dependent
25, U.S.C.A. provides for allotments to Indians "not
upon a reservation, or for whose tribe no reservation has been
provided by trraty, Act of Congress, or Executive order . . .
and patents shall be issued to them for such lands in the
manner and with the restrictions as
and 349." Srctiou 349 provides that '
the trust period and when the lands have been
Indians by patent in
as provided in section
and every allottee shall have the benefit of and be
the laws, both civil and criminal, of the State or
in which they may reside . . . Provided
That until
the issuance of fee-simple patents all allottecs to whom trust
patents shall be issued shall be subject to the exclusive
diction of the United States . . . . " (Emphasis added.) It
clearly appears that neither Congress, nor the Supreme Court
in the Pelican case, intended that the jurisdiction of the
United States over land held in allotment should differ depending upon whether that land had once been part of an
Indian reservation.
The contrary appears to be true in light of the Pelican
case. In that case the argument was that because the land
where the crime occurred was at the time of the crime allotted
to an Indian rather than still part of a reservation it was
no longer "Indian country." The court's entire opinion is
devoted to showing that allotted land, the title to whieh
was still held in trust by the government, was under the
exclusive jurisdietion of the government for the protection
of the Indian enjoying the use and benefit thereof.
The People rely on United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 533
[58 S.Ct. 286, 82 L.Ed. 410], for the proposition that a state
may exereise its criminal jurisdietion over the ''same criminal act" and that the federal government does not assert
exclusive jurisdiction in a situation such as we have here.
In the Me Gowan case the court stated ( p. 536) that the only
question for determination was whether the Heno Indian
Colony was Indian country so far as regulation of the sale
of intoxicants to Indians was concerned. It was held (p.
537, et seq.) that "The words 'Indian country' have appeared in the statutes relating to Indians for more than a
century. \V e must consider 'the changes which have taken
place in our situation, with a view of determining from time
to time what must be regarded as Indian country where it is
spoken of in the statutes.' Also, due regard must be given
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to the fact that from an
period of our history, the Government has
severe penalties to enforce laws
the sale of liquor on lands occupied by Indians
supervision. Indians of the Reno Colony
been established in homes under the supervision and
of the United States. 'l'he policy of Congress,
enforced through the deeisions of this Court, has
been to
the liquor traffic with Indians occupying
sneh a settlement. This protection is extended by the United
8tates 'over all
Indian communities within its
whether within its original territory or territory
subsequently aequired, and whether within or without the
l·im£/s
State.' [Italics added.]
"The fundamental consideration of both Congress and the
Department of the Interior in establishing this colony has
been the protection of a dependent people. Indians in this
colony have been afforded the same protection by the government as that given Indians in other settlements known as
'reservations.' Congress a.lone has the right to determine the
manner in whieh this country's guardianship over the Indians
shall be carried out, and it 1:s immaterial whether Congress
designates a settlement as a 'reservation' or 'colony.' In the
ease of United States v. Pelican, 2:32 U.S. 442, 449 [:34 S.Ct.
;)\)(), [)8 LEd. 67G], this Court said:
" 'In the present ease the original reservation was Indian
country
because 'it had been validly set apart for the
11se of the Indians as such, nnder the superintendence of the
Government.' [Italics added.]
'' rrhe Reno Colony has been validly set apart for the use
of the Indians. It is under the superintendence of the Government. 'l'he Govemment retains title to the lands which it
permits the Indians to occupy. The Government has authority
to enact regulations and protective laws respecting this territory. ' . . . Congress possesses the broad power of legislating
for the protection of the InclianR wherever they may be within
the territory of the United States . . . ' United States v.
Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467,471 [46 S.Ct. 559,70 hEd.10:39].
"When \Ve view the facts of this case in the light of the
relationship which has long existed brtween the Government
ami the Indians-and which continues to date-1:t is not reasonably poss£ule to draw any distinction between this Indian
'colony' anrl 'Indian country.' vVe conclude that section 247
of Title 25, sttpra, does apply to the Reno Colony.
''The federal prohibition against taking intoxicants into
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this Indian colony does not deprive the State of Nevada of its
sovereignty over the area in question. The J3'ederal Government does not assert exclusive jurisdiction within the colony.
Enactments of the Federal Government passed to protect and
guard its Ind,ian war·ds only affect the operation, within the
colony, of such state laws as conflict with the federal enactments." (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that the McGowan case does not even
consider whether or not the "Colony" was once part of an
Indian reservation. It is specifically stated that the Colony
consists of approximately 28 acres of land, title to which was
in the United States, and that the colony was created to
provide homes for needy Indians.
It follows, therefore, that title to the land here involved,
known as the Maggie Jim A.llotmant, was still held in trust
by the United States government at the time the crime was
committed and that it falls within the statutory definition
of "Indian country." (U.S.C.A.. title 18, § 1151.)
Section 1152 [U.S.C.A.., title 18] provides: "Laws governing.
''Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the general
laws of the United States as to the punishment of offenses committed in any place within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States, except the District of Columbia, shall
extend to the Indian country.
"This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one
Indian against the person or property of another Indian,
nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe,
or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the exclusive
jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to the
Indian tribes respectively.''
Section 1153 provides in pertinent part: "Offenses committed within Indian country.
''Any Indian who commits against the person or property
of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape, incest, assault
with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous weapon, arson,
burglary, robbery, and larceny within the Indian country,
shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other
persons committing any of the above offenses, within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." (The second
paragraph of this section relates to rape; the third paragraph
to burglary. Both provide that the crimes shall be defined
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as provided by the laws of the state in which they are committed. Burglary is to be punished in accordance with the
laws of the state in which it is committed.) (June 25, 1948,
ch. 645, 62 Stat. 758, amended May 24, ;949, ch. 139, § 26, 63
Stat. 94.) (Emphasis added.)
Section 3242 provides that: "All Indians committing any
of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, rape,
incest, assault with intent to kill, assault with a dangerous
weapon, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny on and within
the Indian country, shall be tried in the same courts, and in
the same manner, as are all other persons committing any of
the above crimes within the exclusit f' jurisdiction of the
United States." (Emphasis added; ,June 25, 1948, ch. 645,
62 Stat. 827, amended May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §51, 63 Stat. 96.)
As hereinbefore set forth, the referee found that both
petitioner and the victim, Wilbur Dan McSwain, were Mono
Indians and that both were listed as such on the census roll
of Indians of California kept by the United States Department of Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs.
The People argue that an Indian who has become emancipated in some manner from his tribe is to be treated as a
non-Indian for the purpose of jurisdiction in a case such as
this, and there are cases so holding. In Eugene Sol Louie v.
United States, 274 F. 47, the emancipation of the Indian
took place when he received a patent in fee to land; *in People
Y. Ketchum, 73 Cal. 635 [15 P. 353], the defendant was held
not to be a member of any Indian tribe; in State v. Bush, 195
Minn. 413 [263 N.W. 300], the defendant Indian held land
by a patent in fee; *in State v. Jionroe, 83 Mont. 556 [274
P. 840], defendant Indian held land by a patent in fee; *in
People ex rel. Schuyler v. Livingstone, 123 Misc. 605 [205
N.Y.S. 888], defendant was an Indian, but not a member
of any tribe; in State v. Nimrod, 30 S.D. 239 [138 N.W. 377],
defendant was an Indian and held land by patent in fee under
the Dawes Act; *in State v. Howard, 33 Wash. 250 [74 P.
382], the defendant was an Indian but not a member of any
tribe. In the case under consideration, neither the defendant
Carmen, nor the deceased McSwain, had ever received a patent
in fee from the government or hacl been otherwise emancipated in any way.
Despite the specific finding of the referee that neither of
the two Indians involved had ever been emancipated or had
o-;everecl tribal relations from the tribe to which they be*See section 349, Title 25, U.S.C.A., heretofore quoted.
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longed, the People argue that
"
Indians; that nc·ither of them was en'r eout rolled in any way
by the Bureau of Indian Affain-; or by the Indian
tion. It is contended that both Carmen and the deceased
McSwain were free to do as they pleased without interference from either the federal goyernment or by an Indian
agent. The referee specifieally pointed out that the
ment of Indian Affairs does not exereise
any California Indians. These
of the
without merit in view of the referee's findings and the evidence supporting them. The record also shows that the Mono
Indians (including Carmen and McSwain) lived in "tribal
vmys"; that they have a "chief"; and that
have "meetings once in a while of their own" that the burial service is
referred to as a "powwow" (Transcript on
pp.
46, 47).
The People also contend that the case of United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 [6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228], with its
wardship theory, is obsolete. From this it is
that
because Indians are now citizens of the United States and
of the state in which they reside
tit. 8, § 1401
[formerly tit. 8, §§ 601, 604]; Anderson v. 1J1athews, 174 Cal.
537 [163 P. 902] ; Piper v. Big Pine School Dist., 193 Cal.
664 [226 P. 926]) they should be subject to the laws of the
state in which they reside. It is said, with merit, that Congress itself has recognized the change in the condition of
the California Indian in that it has expressly stated that
California has jurisdiction over crimes by Indians in Indian
country within the state. Publie Law 280 was passed by the
first session of the 83rd Congress, 1953, giving to California
jurisdiction in such situations. The fact remains, however,
that at the time the crime in question was
Congress
had not seen fit to so act.
'l'he statutes here involved, which in my opinion provide
for exclusive jurisdiction of the federal court in cases such
as this, have a background of wisdom and foresight. Those
conversant with the early history of the western states will
recall the bitter conflicts bet>Yeen the native Indians and the
white immigrants who first settled these states. As a result
of the bitterness engendered by these struggles a strong feel~
ing of prejudice existed against the remaining Indian population after the white man beeame master ol' the western
domain and established an organized system of government
therein. The early history of California is replete with in-
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stances in whieh native Indians were denied redress in our
r·ourts beeanse of this prejudice. A,; a result of this situawhieh i,; well known to those whose memories go baek
two or thr·ce
the federal government saw fit, in
the administration of its wardship over the remaining Indian
population, to
that the federal eourts should have
exclusive jurisdiction in cases such as this and thereby removed the Jndian from whatever disadvantage he might have
being prosecuted in state courts in an area where prejudice
""''"""'~" the Indian might still exist. These statutes remained
m effect so far as California is concerned until 1953 which
was long after the commission of the erime here involved.
It appears from the foregoing that since defendant Rayna
'l'om Carmen and the victim, ·wilbur Dan McSwain, were
unemandpated Mono Indians and that the Maggie Jim Allotment on whieh the crime occurred was Indian country, the
Superior Court in and for the County of Madera, State of
California, ·was without jurisdiction to try defendant Rayna
Tom Carmen for the erimes with which he was charged.
For the foregoing reasons the prisoner should be discharged.
'l'RAYNOH, Concurring and Dissenting.-! coneur in the
holding of the court insofar as it constitutes a rule of decision
for the disposition of cases arising in the future. It is clear,
however, from the authorities cited in both the majority and
the dissenting opinion that the question of the availability of
habeas corpus to attack subject matter jurisdiction by proof
of facts outside the record has been clouded in uncertainty
ill tbi,., state. (Sl'P also Edmollds, .T., r·o1wnrring, In rc Bell,
19 Cal.2d 488, 506-507 [122 P.2d 22) ; In re Wyatt, 114 CaL
App. 557, 562 [300 P. 132]; 1 Witkin, California Procedure,
Jurisdiction, § 162, pp. 429-430.) The United States Supreme
Court appears to have recognized a similar uneertainty with
respect to the federal rule. (See Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786,
791 [65 S.Ct. 989, 89 L.Ed. 1367].) In Phelan v. Superior
Court, 35 Cal.2d 363 [217 P .2d 951], this court considered
the effeet of uneertainty in the law as to the adequaey of the
remedy by appeal on the right to attaek an order of the trial
eourt by writ of mandate. It stated: "In view of the uncertainty which has existed in the law with respect to the
appealability of the order in question and also in view of the
holdings of this court that an appeal is not adequate in a case
of this type, petitioner should not be denied the use of the
writ because of his failure to appeal. It would obviously
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be a hardship upon a litigant who has been misled by such uncertainty in the law if we were to resolve the
and in the same proceeding deny his petition for a writ on the
ground that he in fact did have an adequate remedy by appeal." (35 Cal.2d at 371-372; see also In re B'ine, 47 Cal.2d
814, 818 [306 P.2d 445].) Similarly, the uncertainty that
has existed as to the availability of the writ of habeas corpus
to attack the jurisdiction of the trial court in a case of this
sort should preclude holding concurrently with the resolution
of that uncertainty that such an attack can only be made in
the trial court, at least when, as in this case, petitioner's attempt to raise the issue on appeal makes clear that he has
not sought to abuse the remedy by delaying the attack until
conviction in the federal courts would become difficult or
impossible.
I concur in the conclusion of Justice Carter that the evidence taken before the referee establishes that the Superior
Court in and for the County of Madera, State of California,
was without jurisdiction to try petitioner for the crimes with
which he was charged, and accordingly, I would discharge the
prisoner.
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-Notwithstanding the long continued contest in the litigation before us it appears to me
that there is no real basis for debate on the controlling issue.
If we had a record disclosing a substantial conflict in evidence
as to the facts upon which state jurisdiction depends then
the majority conclusion would be tenable. But we have no
such record.
Upon the facts shown, the Constitution (art. VI, § 2) and
laws (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1151, 1152, 1153, 3242) of the
United States operate to vest exclusive jurisdiction of the
subject matter of this case-the penal responsibility of the
petitioner for the act allegedly constituting the crime for
which he was tried and convicted-in the courts of the United
States. Jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action is
vested in, or prohibited to, a court by the Constitution, federal
or state, and as may be defined or implemented by statutes
which do not transgress constitutional limits. (See Harrington v. Superior Court (1924), 194 Cal. 185, 188 [2] [228
P. 15] ["Jurisdiction in any proceeding is conferred by law;
that is, by the constitution or by statutP "].) Jurisdiction of
the subject matter exists by law or it does not exist and cannot be acquired. (See Schlyen v. Schlyen (1954), 43 Cal.2d
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P.2d 897] ; Taylor v.
(1923), 192
[6] [218 P. 756, 51 A.L.R. 1074] ["Neither a
party, nor both parties, can vest a court with jurisdiction to
which it is a stranger"]; King v. Kutner-Goldstein Co. (1901),
135 Cal.
67 [67 P. 10]; Costa v. Banta (1950), 98 CaL
App.2d
182 [2] (219 P.2d 478]; Higgins v. Coyne (1946 ,
75
69, 70 [1] [170 P.2d 25]; Glass v. Bank
America etc. Assn. (1936), 17 Cal.App.2d 645, 647 [3] [62
P.2d
; Mannix v. Superior Court (1933), 133 Cal.App.
740, 743
[24 P.2d 507] ["A court cannot, by presuming
to act, invest itself with jurisdiction")
" [J] udicial duty
is not less fitly performed by declining ungranted jurisdiction [or, here, jurisdiction which the Congress has declared
is in the federal courts] than in exercising firmly that which
the Constitution and the laws confer." (Ex parte McCardle
(1868), 7 Wall. (U.S.) 506, 515 [19 L.Ed. 264].)
Since by force of federal law jurisdiction over petitioner's
act and his penal responsibility therefor is vested in the federal courts and therefore prohibited to California the petitioner is entitled to discharge from state custody.

